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APPELLANTS' BRIEF

The pl·aintiffs, by their petition in .this pro-ce-eding,
originally sought writs ·of prohibition and mandamus,
the first, t·o restrain and prohibit the Board of Education
of Emery ·County School District from closing or disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2
continuing the primary and grammar s-chool at Elmo
T·own, in said ;eounty, and the second, to require the defendants tn ·0ontinue to operate and maintain said s.chool.
The facts on which these writs are sought are in the form
of two c.auses of arction; and ;the following allegations
are con1mon to both .causes: That the Board of Education of Emery County !School District is a public corpora,...
tion of this st ate, and that the individuals named as
defendants are rthe members thereof; that the territo~rial
boundaries of the school district are coextensive with the
territorial boundaries of Emery county, and that the
same is divided into five representative districts, one of
vvhich .embraces Elmo Town, an unin0orporaked town
'vith a population of ahout 19'4 persons; that the latter,
together with persons residing near but without the
corporate limits ·Of the Town, provide a ·popula;~ion of
about 471 pers·ons, from which a school population of
about B5 .children,· not including high school pupils, is
furnished for the public school, which, since about the
year 1910, ha.s been operated and maintained in Elmo
Town, for the edueation of pers·ons eligible to attend the
primary and grammar grades; ,that said E·mery ~County
Scho~ol District owns, and on the 9th day of April, 1940,
owned, a four-room brick s,chool building at Elmo, of
modern design, with all necessary furniture and equipnlent, aVlailabl·e, ready, and adequate as a primary and
gramn1ar school for said Elmo Town and the territory
adjaeent theret·o; that the defendants have, or ea.n obtain,
1

the funds necessary for the support and maintenance of
said school;

~that

the individuals named as defendants,
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as 1nembers of the B.oard of Edueation of Emery ·County
School District, on April 9, 1940, adopted a res·olution to
the effect that after, the closing of the school year 19391940 the said school at Eln1o To\vn would be discontinued
and abolished, and that for the school year 1940-1941,
and succeeding sohnol yoors, all students eligible to a.t~end the ·primary and grammar grades of the public
school in Elmo "\Yould be transported to the Town of
·Cleveland, ''~thin Emery o·ounty School District, a distance of about 4.1 miles, there .to attend sehool; that the
defendants intend to discontinue and elose said school at
Elmo To\vn, f.or the school year 19·40-41 and sueceeding
years, and will do so unless restrained by the· ·nrder and
decree of the ,district court; that the plaintiffs have no
plain, speedy, or adequate re1nedy in the ordinary course
of lja".,.; "that the plaintiffs and petitioners were present
at the meeting ·Of the Board of Education of the Emery
C·ounty School District at which ·the res-olution mentioned
in paragraph 8 hereof was adopted, .and before its adoption objected to the adoption ·Of such resolution, and a.t
the said meeting then 1and there ·Oppos-ed the adopti·on of
said resolution and then and there demanded that the
said board of education continue to maintain a. p·rimary
and grammar grade school in the Town of Elmo.''
The f.o,regoing summary contains, in substanee, the
whole of the first eause of action sta,ted in the petition;
and the second .cause .of action contains the f.ollowing additional alleg'ations: ·That the establishment and maintenance of said s-chool in Elmo T·own has be~n one of the
inducements for plaintiffs and other residents of said
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Town and the area. adjacent thereto to establish residences in and ne,ar said Town; that ev.er since its establishment, and until its dis~continuance, said s-chool was
an institution for the social, intellectual and mio·ral betterment of the pupils attending the same and other members
of said community; that in reli,ance ·On the continued
existence of said sehool, the plaintiffs and other members
of said community have expended large sums in the
building ·of homes and the reclamation and development
of farms, and have incurred public debt to provide themselves with a culinary water system; that .if said s·chool
is dis-continued, the value of their homes and farms -will
greatly depreciate, and they will he less able to pay their
public de·bt; ''that without said school, said community
will be a less desirable place in whieh to live, the populati·on thereof vvill diminish in numbers, 1and t;hose who
ren1ain will be deprived of the s-ocial, moral and intellectual advantages that have accrued by virtue of the
existence of said school;'' that said action of the defend'an ts will require that children of tender age residing in
said ·community will be abse.nt from the care and control
of their parents f;oor from 8 to 10 hours each 80hool day,
and will deprive said ~childr.en of an opportunity to have
their noonday meal on each sehool day tat the home of
their parents, and will subject said children to the hazards
of travel for a distance ·of from 10 to 25 miles on each
sehool day, by motor vehicles over only partly developed
roads, and a considerable number of said children are
and will he made ill by riding such distances in s.chool
busses; that to transp·o-rt said ehildren to Cleveland to
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school \Yill cause their parents and guardians to suffer
\Yorry and anxiety c.oncerning- the safety .and welfare of
their children, a.nd \Yill be injurious and detrimental to
the physica1, mental, and moral welfare of said children;
that during t;he tin1e said school has been maintained,
amateur dramatic productions, musicales and recitals
have been g-iven as a part of its curriculum, all of which
the pupils, the plraintiffs and .other residents of the community have 'been privileged to a.ttend; .that said entertainments jhave been of mutual educational advantage to
-the students of the school and the residents of said community; t·h:at if s'aid -children are permitted to part~cipate
in educational activities in the community to which they
are transported for sch·ool, they will be required to travel
by automobile or other vehicle a.t late hours, and at times
when the hazard of travel1and the danger of exposure t·o
inclement weather are far greater than th.ey would be if
said Elmo school were n·ot dis.continued; that the plaintiffs and other residents of s.a.id community are unable
to maintain a private school at Elmn for the education
of their childr;en, and there is no other school conducted
at said place; that said Elmo Town has not' had the forms
of amusement common to larger communities, and that
said school has been its principal soci1al, cultural and entertainment center; "that the said action of the defendants in dis.continuing said school was made without the
consent and against the unanimous opp·ositi·on of the inhabitants of said .community, and will deprive these plain. tiffs and petitioners of tl1eir property and their liberty
\Vithout due process of law in violation of the pr.o~visions
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of the 14th amendm~ent to the Constitution of the United
~States and of 1Sec.tion 7 of Article I of the C·onstitution
of the ~State of Utah;'' that defendants adopted the said
resolution with full knowle~dge of the matters and things
here ina hove set forth; and ''that by reason of the matters and things hereinabo~ve set forth the said action of
the defendants was .and is discriminatory, arbitrary, unreasonable and ~contrary to law." (:Ahs. 1).
T·he defendants filed a demurrer to the petition, the
principal grounds of which-and the only grounds we
shall notice-are, that neither cause of action therein
stated alleges facts sufficient to , warrant the court in
issuing either an alternative or other writ of mtandate,
or an .alternative or other writ of prohibition. They, the
defendants, at the same time, filed an answer to said
p·eti tion and each .cause of ta.ction therein set f.orth, in
whi0h they substantially say: That the population of
the town ·of :Elmo does not ex,ceed 194 p·ersons, and that
said p)opulation together with all the persons who reside
near but without the c.orporate limits of ·Ehno does not
exeeed 2.50 p·ersons; that the total school popul~ation attending the Elmo school, has not been in eXJcess of 71
ehildren, and .at the end of the s-chool year 19'39-40, the
school p·opulation ther·eof was 68 ehildren; that the
4-room brick school building at Eilm·o, and the equipment
are not suitahle, iadequa.t.e or desirable for continued use
in carrying ·On a primary and grammar s-chool for the
students ·of Elmo Town and the territory a~djacent thereto; that Em.ery county is divided into five repres.enta.tive
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precincts, one -of ''"·hich embraces Desert Lake, Vietor,
·and Elmo, and that t·he entire population of these towns
does not exceed 250 persons, -and that t·he school p·opulation thereof does not exeeed 6'8 students of the primary
and gramn1ar grades; that the entire population of
Emery county is 7059 persons, an·d the assessed valuation
f·or the year 193'9 Wtas $4,75·2,000; that .the county is
s-parsely populated, and the people ·Of said eoun ty reside,
in the main, at great distances from each other; that for
many years la.st past it hras been and now is the practice
of said school district to furnish transportation for the
students ·attending the vari·ous s·cho-ols of said district;
that up to and including the school year 19'39-40 there
had been maint,ained at Elmo a. public s-chool for the
children of primary and grammar grades, and there has
been employed three teachers ; that in 1939-40, 68 stude.nts from Elmo Town, Desert ;Lake, and Victor attended the Elmo scho·nl, and tall of the students attending
said school and residing at Vietor and Desert Lake have
been transported to and from the sam·e over the ordinary
roads existing in Emery county; that said students have
been t:r:ansported about ten miles .each way in going t·oand from said Elm.o school; that on April 9,- 1940, the
Board of Education of Emery C·ounty 'School District
adopted a. res·olution to the ·effect that from and after
the school year 1939-40 the school a.t Elmo would he discontinued and abolished, and for the s~cho.ol year 1940-41
and succeeding years all students residing at Elmo,
De·ser.t Lake, and Vi,ctor, and ·eligible to attend the primary and grammar gDades of the public s·chool at Elmo
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would be transp·orted to the Town of ·Cleveland, in Emery
county, and within 'Emery ·C·ounty :School District, there
to attend school; that between 'Elmo and Cleveland there
is a go·od, newly .constructed, gravelled highway mraintained by Emery county as a county highway, which road
will be used in transp-orting the students to and from
Desert L·ake, Victor, and Elmo to Cleveland; th:a t the
distance bet"\\7een Elmo and 1Cleveland is 4.1 miles, and
that the Board of Education of Emery County School
District has well-equipped and heated s'chool busses and
capable and ex:perien:ced drivers; that none of the students attending .the sch-ool at ·Clev·eland will be required
to be aWJay from home for any p-eriod of time greater
than they are now required to he away from home in
attending t;he school at Elmo ; that the school building
at 'Cleveland is comrnodious, and has, in addition to class
rooms, a gyn1nrasium, an auditorium with a stage, s-cenery
and other ·equipment, and it is equipped with baths and
toilets ; that the sch-ool a.t ~Cleveland has many other advantages and facilities which rare not afforded by the
Elmo school; that on ·O'r about April 2, 1940, t:he S!tate
Board ·of Education recommended to the def.endant Board
that they consolidate the s~chools in Emery county, by
eliminating .the school at Elmo •and by transporting the
students attending that school to ~Cleveland, as a. wise
and ·economical m·ove, and one which would be for the
best interests of students, parents, taxpayers, and all concerned; that it i~ too late to make a. levy for the purpose
of raising funds to op·erate and eonduct the Elmo school;
and the defendants deny the allegations contained in the
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3th and 7th paragTaphs of the second cause ·o.f action
stated in the petition. (Abs. 16).
T·he pl:aintiffs demurred to the answers to both causes
of action, on the ground tha.t they did not state faets
sufficient to eonstitute defenses. (Abs. 3-3).
The court overruled the defendants' demurrer tn the
plaintiffs' petition, and sustained the plaintiffs' demurrer to the defendants' ans\Yer; and the defendants declining to take leave to amend but electing to stand on
their ·ans\ver, the court ordered judgment for the plaintiffs that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue. (Abs.
34).
By the assignments of error, the defendants 00:mplain of these rulings on the d·emurrers, and especially
the overruling of the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiffs' petition.

The :above recitals of the -allega.tio.ns and .claims of
the respective parties are p.robahly prolix; but we desired
to present the statement al·ong with the argument, and
we think the facts clearly s·how that the defendants, in
ordering the Elmo school closed, w·as not actuated by
any motive or iconsidertation .other than the best interests
of the Emery County School District. H·owever, the
theory of the plaintiffs' petition is, that it was the welfare and convenience of the school patrons a.t Elmo which
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alone were to be consulted. On the authority ·of Iverson.
v. Union Free High School District, 186 Wis. 34J2, 2012
N. W. 788, and such analogous e~ses as Williams v. Nelson, 45 Utah 2~55, 145 P. 39·, it is our contention that the
eomplaint states only ·one cause ·Of actio.n, notwithstanding the various acts of mis-conduct alleged; and it has
been so regarded in the foregoing statement of the case.
The theory ·of the so-called first cause of aetiori is, that
the board ·of education is without authority or discretion
to close or abandon iany school, and so acted without authority in closing the Elmo school; as, at the trial of the
demurrer, plaintiffs' counsel argued, that there is no
express grant of power to the sehool board to close the
school at E1mo, although they eonceded that school boards
have such powers 1as are expressly given and such as may
be inferred. The theory of the so-called se·cond cause of
action is, that th·e defendant board gr·ossly abused its
discretion in closing the s-chool; which is inferable from
the allegation (although by itself a stark legal conclusion), th1at. ''the said action of the defen:dants was and
is discriminatory, .arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary
to law.'' It has been said that-'' Alleging that threatened
dis-cqntinuance of ·school was :arbitrary, unreasonable,
unjust, ·oppressive, unwarranted, and illegal, if unaccompanied by supporting facts, would he merely pleading
legal conclusions.'' Corley v. Movrdgomery, 2'26 Mo. App.
79:5, 46 s. w. 2d 283.
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THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE PETITION AND ADMITTED BY
DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER, ARE INSUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR TO SUPPORT THE JUDG·MENT ALLO,VING SUCH
WRIT.

This court has held that a demurrer to a petition for
l(l. write of mandamus admits all facts set forth in the
petition (Higgins v. Glenn, 65 Utah 406, 237 P. 513); and
that the question presented to the Supreme Court is,
whether the facts admitted are sufficient to entitle the
plaintiff to a writ ·of manda1nus or to support a judgment
granting such \Yrit. Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen,
48 Utah 214, 159 P. 541. In view of our statutes, and the
decisions of this and other courts, it cannot, in our opinion, be ·Contended that the defendant board acted without
authority of la\Y. In Hales v. Board of Education, 81
Utah 404, 18 P. 2d 899, the court said: "The general
powers of hoards of education in Utah sCiho·o1 districts
of the first class are specified in se-ction 4617, Comp. Lavvs
Utah 1917, as amended by ·chapter 45 of the Laws of
Utah 1929, page ·60. Among the powers therein conferred
·are the following: 'The hoard of edu-cation shall have
the power and authority to purchase a.nd sell schoolhouse
sites and impr·ovements thereon; to construct and erect
school buildings and to furnish the sam·e; to establish,
locate, and maintain kindergarten s,chools, common
schools, consisting of grammar grades, high schools, and
industrial or manual training schools.' '' That section is
now Rev.

~Sts.

1933, 75-11-20,

although

somewhat
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broadened. And in Beard v. Bo:ard .of Ed'WCation, 81
Utah 51, 16 P. 2d 900, it was held that the '·'-entire control
of schools and school property ·within their respective
districts is vested in hoards of education." In Utah, as
in Ohio, it may now he said, tha:t "under ·our existing
school laws Boards of Education are clothed with almost
unlimited p·ower." Stinson v. Bo·ard of Education, 17
Ohio App. 437.
It may be true, as argu.ed by plaintiffs a.t the trial
·of the demurrers, that ''there is no express grant of
power to the s,chool board to close the school at Elmo;''
but it is certainly an implied power. In Crow· v. Consolida~ted School District, .........-Mo. App .......... , 3'6· S. W. 2d
676, ·the ·court, after stating that the statute setting·forth
that the powers of qualified voters of a. comm.on schooJ
district are inapplicable to consolidated districts, said:
''But t·he power to establish schools ne-cessarily carries
with it the power t.o abandon other 8choo1s no longer required, and said se-ction confers upoin the hoard the
power to dispose ·of .such property. The p.ower to change
the sehool ,site in eity and cons-olidated districts should
rest s·omewhere, and a reasonable construction of the
law i~ndicates an intention to 0onfer t1hat power upon the
hoard."

In School Committee v. Boa.rd of Educ~ation,

186. N. ~C. 643, 120 S. E. 202, it was held, that change of
proposed schoolhouse site was not beyond the powers
vested in a. board of education or s-o unr·easonable as to
amount to an oppressive and manifest abuse ·o.f dis,cretion
eonferred upo.n it by law.

In Do,venport v. Board of
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Educal'iOJl, 183 K. ·C. 570, 112 IS. E. 266, it vvas held, that

"'vhere the s.choolhouses shall be. located in the district,
and in wh.at manner they shall he conducted, are obvi·ously matters to he decided by the school authorities.''
In Dahl v. In~dependen.f Schoo·l District, 45 S. D. 308, 187
K. \Y·. 638, the eourt held that the directors of an independent district had povver to close ·one school in Dead\Yood, and to furnish transportation to another school
in the same .eity, alth.ough there was no statute sp·ecifi·Cally authorizing independent school districts to furnish
transportation to pupils. There are several ,cases in
\Yhich the facts alleged were similar to the facts in this
ease; the foll·owing being cases of that character:

State v. Desonia, 67 Mont. ·201, 21 5 P. 220;
1

State v. Board of Education,
81 W. V a. 353, 94 S. E. 500;
D.avis v. Mendenhall,
150 Ind. 205, 49 ·N. E. 1048.
In the Montana case, in which the relator had p·etitioned for a writ of mandate, the trustees of the school
district, at the annual meeting held in July, 19212, had
decided that it would be f·or the best interest of the district to maintain school in only one of the three schoolhouses, and that that should be in the Daleview schoolhouse. The !eourt said the s·ole question in the case was
whether the defendants were under legal duty to maintain school in the Robinson schoolhouse, although a statute empowered the trustees to close a. school when they
deemed it for the best interest ·Of all the pupils in the
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district. The court co.ncluded, that ''manifestly they
(the trustees) must ha.ve .authority in a district, where
more than one school has been established, to close all
but ·one school and send all of the .children to that one,
when they deem it for the best interest of all the pupils.,.
The law provided that the distriet should pay for the
transportation of the pupils. In the West Virginia case,
the board .of education of ·the independent district of
West Union provided that ·only ,c.ertain grades should he
taught in certain buildings in the district, within two
miles of the children's ·homes, or, in lieu thereof, provision for transportation he made. The board bad authority to establish graded sch·ools. .The court said:
''There is nothing in the statute inhibiting it (the hoard)
from treating all t:he huildings in its district as one building, and for the purpose of grading the scho·ols, providing for instruction in certain grades in one building, and
instructi·o:n in other grades in other buildings, and this is
what the respondent board of education has done in this
ease.'' In the Indiana .case, which was an action f.or injunction, a.nd in which t:he plaintiff sought to prevent a
school trustee from abandoning· and discontinuing a
schnol in the district, and from changing the site of the
schoolhouse wherein the school had hee.n previously conducted. The statute at tlha.t time gave a township school
trustee discretionary power to cause the abandonment
or dis.0ontinuance of a public s-chool, or the rem·oval ·or
change of a. school building or sites; and the court .held:
'·'That such discretion is not abused by a school tru~tee
who discontinued a school for an indedinite time· because
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the pupils attending· 0ould be accommodated a.s "\vell or
better in other s.ehools, .and notified p·atrons, offering the
privileges of other conYenient schools which they might
choose.''
In Sellie'r r. Dedau:r, 134 Miss. 589, 99 ·So. 439, the
court held, that ''the eounty school board may so adjust
districts and locate school buildings as to best serve the
interests, welfare, and ·convenience of the people of the
district as in their judgment m.ay be needful, and the
courts will not undertake to control their judgment in
such matters." While our statute no: longer contains the
word ''remove'' with reference to schoolhouses, the word
"locate" in the present statute is its ·equivalent. In
Golln,ick v. Luedtke, 45 S. D. 308, 187 N. W. 542, it. was
held that abandonment of the building ·On the old site,
and t.Jle .constructi·on •of a building on the new site, is a
removal of the schoolhouse within the meaning of a statute of that state. In McBee v. School District, ......... Ore.
---------, 96 P. 2d 207, it was held: ''The words 'the removal
of the schoolhous-e,' as used in the .statute requiring a
vote of two-thirds of tih·e voters present and voting at a
school meeting to order the removal .of a s.choolhouse,
are not interpreted literally, but include a change in location whether old structure is moved to a new site or is
abandoned and a new building ·erected in another location.''
As grounds for the allegation that the action of the_
defendants, in ·closing the Elmo school, was discriminatory, arbitrary, unreasonable and .contrary to· law, the
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plaintiffs allege: (1) That in reliance on the continued
existence ·of said s.chool ·the plaintiffs and other members
of s.a.id .community have expended large sums in the building of homes, etc., and without the schooJ the said community will be a less desirable plac.e in which to. live;
('2) that said action of t;he defendants will require that
children of tender age residing in said c·ommunity to be
~a'bsent from their parents f·or from 8 to 10 hours each
sehool day, and they will be subje-cted to the hazards of
travel, by motor vehicle, for a distance -of from 10 to 25
miles 'On each school day; ( 3) that if said s,chool is discontinued, the plaintiffs and ot•her residents of said comn1unity will be deprived of the opportunity of attending
the educational activities mentioned, such a.s amateur
dramatic productions, musicales, and recitals; and (4)
that said aetion of the defendants was taken without
the ,consent .and against the unanimous opposition of the
inhabitants of said .community, and will deprive the
plaintiffs ·o.f their property without due process of law,
in violation of the Constitutions of the United States
and this state.
The foregoing are not reasons justifying the charge
that the defendant hoard, by its action in diseontinuing
the s-chool at ·Elmo, acted arbitrarily or in violation of
law. In Keever v. B·o1a;r:d of EdUJca~tion, --------- Ga..........., 3
IS. E. 2d 886, the eourt said: ''The plaintiffs contend that
the se~hool in Braden district is injured by the conduct
of the d·efendants; but in arguing this contention they
apparently ·overlook the paramount and sole ohje-ctive
in the maintenance of the public s-chools of the state.
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It c-annot be said that the public sch·nols of the State are
n1aintained for the purp-ose of enhancing tihe property
Yalues or satisfying the " ..ishes of adults, other than as
the~.. may be incidental to that sole objective, whi,c.h is the
education and best interest of the school children thems-elves. If at any point oth·er consider-ations c-onflict
with this worthy object, all such considerations must
yield. With this wide and wise purpose in view the legislature of this State realized that its accomplishment
would necessitate the exe~cise of wide discretion, and
to this end such disc.retion has :by law been vested in the
county board of educati·on.. * * * and unless it is
made clearly to appear t:bat they are a·cting in violation
of law· or gr·nssly abusing their discretion, tiheir conduct
of the schools of the ·0ounties will not be enj-oined by the
courts. It appearing from the allegations of the petition
that the defendants were acting within authority· given
t_bem by law, and that they were not abusing t~1e dis-cretion vested in them, the demurrer was properly sustained and the petition dismissed.'' And in People v.
Baird, 307 Ill. 503, 139 N. E. 132., it was said: ''There is
nothing in the statute providing for the organization of
a c.ommunity high s-chool district which requires tJh·at a.
~c.ertain community center shall exist for all the territ~ory to be included in the district. So far as the term
'community' is concerned, it is intended to apply only
to school purp•oses, and not to other habits of the people
living in a proposed district.''
In State v. Spoka;ne School District, 147 Wash. 467,
2·66 P. 189, t1he court ·said: ''That many people have· built
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homes, irnproved their lands and yards, established residences and n1aintained places of business, with reference
to the old s.chnol site as being permanent, which has become a vested right, the violation of which will deprive
petitioners of their property \vithout due proc,ess of law.
No law is cited nor reason given finr the argument, and
we know of none that courts will apply. The judgment
of public authorities in the matter of the location of publie buildings will not be interfered with by the courts
up·on such ·considerations. * * * In a nutshell, this
whole controversy arises over a question of judgment.
The petitioners before the board, the appellants here,
are not in agreement wit~h the members of the board.
That disagreement of itself is not for the oourts. The
law has plainly vested the hoard of directors .of school
districts such as this with discretionary power in such
matters, and, the directors having examined into, and
passed upon, the matter, in the exercise .of their discreti·on, the courts have no right or power to review the conclusions reac.hed hy them as a board, in the absence of
a showing of abuse of discretion on their part, which is
not the ease here.''
''Whether the ward school is any longer required
for district's use depends on needs and circumstanees
m entire district, not merely ward there·of. '' It was 8'0
held in Corley v. Monjtgomery, 2:26 Mo. App. 7'95, 46 S.
W. 2d 283; and the .court also held, that taxpayers are
.not entitled to mandamus to compel continued maintenance of ward school merely because continuance thereof
would he more convenient for children. And so, in the
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case before this ·court, t·he question is not whether the
defendant board's action 'vas for the best interests of
the patrons of the Elmo school, but whether it \vas for
the best interests of the entire Emery

~County

S.ehool

District.

In cases of this kind, it is often alleged, as in D·avis
c. 1llendenlzall, 150 Ind. 205, 49· N. E. 1048, that the
defendants endeavored to carry into effect some change
in the sehools against the wishes of the school patrons
of the district. In Bay State Live-Stock Co. v. Bing,
51 Neb. 5'70, '71 N. '':· 311, it was held: ''The foregoing
section confers on the officer named exclusive original
jurisdiction of the designated subject-matter, and the
jurisdiction is not dependent upon or affected by the
presentation of a petition or other exp-ression of the will
or desire of the resident voters .of the terri tory to be
·organized into a school district, nor is any notice of the
proposed action of the officer necessary.'' And in Gaddis
v. School District, 92 N eb. 701, 139 N. W. 280, it was
held that-'' since the rep·eal of the proviso to section 23,
subd. 14, c. 79, Comp. St. 1911, there is no requirement
that .the question of the selection of sch·ool sites or the
erection of school buildings be submitted to the electors
of a city district, in or·der to authorize the board of
education to purchase sites and erect buildings.''
1
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THE COURT ALSO ERRED IN SUSTAINING PLAINTIF'FS' DEMURRER TO THE DEFENDANTS' ANSWER.

There cannot he any question that the defendants'
answer raised issues as to the necessity or expediency
of the action of the boar~d of education in ordering the
removal of the Elmo school; and, in a similar case, it
was held, that "the ·court cannot, with only the petition
for an injunction before it, pass on the necessity of
expediency of the action of a township board in ordering
the removal ·of a school house.'' James v~. Gettinger,
123 Iowa, 199, 98 N. W. 723. The more important question is, as in Brooks v. Sha;nnon, (Okl.) 86 P. (2d) 792,
and as stated by that court, "whether or not it is conclusively shown from the record that the Board acted
arbitrarily, maliciously, or unjustly in· closing the school,
~or whether or not same was an abuse of its discretionary
authority as contended.'' In stating the case, that court
said: "It (the record) showed that for some years
past, the school authorities had been considering the
advisability of closing some one of these schools. Particular consideration was given as to the educational
advantages ·offered, the financial interest of the district
as well as the utility of the various building.s. It was
upon the reeommendation 1of the supe.rintendent. of
. s-chools, the assistant superintendent in charge of elementary education and the maintenance department of
the schools that the Board of Education reached the
conclusion that the best interest of the entire district
\Vlould result in the abandonm,ent of Washington School
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and assignment of the students attending that 8ehool to
other schools.'' The court held: ~~It would be but
natural that son1e of the ehildren attending the 'Vashiugton School 'viii .suffer some inconvenience by this
ehange. There is nothing in the record that convinces
this court, that the B·oard of Education abused its discretion 'in closing '': ashington School, or that they did
other than "~hat they thought was for the best interest
of the school system and all concerned, and such authority and discretion should not be interfered with by injun,ction 'unless their action is so clearly unrea~onable as to
amount to an ·Oppressive and n1anifest abuse of discretion.' '' And the court quoted the following fl"lom an
earlier Oklahoma case:·
A taxpayer and citizen of a s~hool district
having children of school age cannot maintain an
action against the officers of said district calling
in question the propriety of their public acts upon
the ground that the act complained ·of 'vill make it
less convenient for him to send his children to
school.
In this class of cases it has been common practice for
the school board ·defendant to ~liege in its answer the
reas-ons for taking the action complained of, and to conclude, that in so acting they have acted fairly, honestly
and impartially in the exercise of their best judgment
and discretion in the matter. This does not indicate
any burden resting ~on the defendant, as, presumably,
the determination of the board to take the action has
been reached by the exercise of intelligent judgment
in connection therewith. In the case of Robb v. Stone,
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296. Pa. 482, 146 A. 91, the court, quoting from another

case, said: "If it appeared that the prop~o~sed abandonment of the pres·ent site was demanded because of its
inadequacy, or because of considerations affecting the
public health, or because the adoption of a new site would
result in advantages bearing some reasonable proporti~on to the expenditure required, or that there was
reasonable ground f.or difference of opinion with respect
to these matters, the court would be witho~t jurisdiction
to interfere \vith the determination of the board as to
its line ~of action;'' and, further:
That all the things here con1plained of, that
is to say, the abandonment of the present site
regardless of the amount exp·ended thereon, and
the selection and purchase of the one proposed,
are within the power delegated to the scho~ol
board, is not open to question; and presumably
the determination of the board to do these things
rests upon considerations of public welfare, and
has been reached by the exercise of intelligent
judgment in connection therewith. The burden
of showing the contrary, when the action of a
school board is challenged with respect to matters
·committed to~ its discretion, i.s a heavy one; for
the power of the .courts in such eases is exceedingly limited, and they are permitted to interfere
only where it is made apparent that it is not di.scretion that is being exercised but arbitrary w1ll
and cap·rice.
The court, in the same case, said, that ''when the
contention is that the proposed action is unwise, no
matter by what consensus of opinion this is shown, the
law will refer it to mistaken judgment over which it
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has no supervision;" and in Corley r. AI ont gomery,
2:26 Mo. .6.-\.pp. 795, 46 S. ,,,. . ( 2d) 283, the court held,
that ~'in mandamus suit to con1pel continuance of school,
~ourt could not inquire ''Thether board acted 'visely in
threatening discontinuance.'' In Beard l'. Board of Education, 81 l;tah 51, 16 P. (2d) 900, this court said, that
Hit is well established that, if the action of the boa.rd
of education is '\Yithin the powers conferred upon it by
the Legislature, and pertains to a matter in which the
board is vested \Yith authority to act, the courts will
not review the action of such a board to substitute its
judgment for that of the board as to matters within its
discretion.'' And in State ex rel. Bishop v. Morehouse,
38 lTtah 23±, 112 P. 169, the court held, that "th·e action
of a public officer which requires the exercise of discretion will not be reviewed by mandamus, unless he
is guilty of a clear and willful disregar·d of duty or acts
capriciously or with partiality.'' In McBee v. School
District, ________ Ore. ________ , 96 P. (2d) 207, it was held,
that ''courts can interfere with the exercise of authority
of school boards only wh-en the boards disregard their
authority and pursue an unauthorized course.'' And in
School Committee v. Board of Education, 186 N. C. 143,
120 S. E. 202, the second headnote reads: "In the
absence of gross abuse, courts will not contfloJ the discretion conferred by law upon public ·officers, such as a
board of education, in the discharge of their duties.''
The petition does not show unauthorized action nor
abuse of discretion by the defendant board, and the
defendants' answer shows that they acted deliberately
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and intelligently in removing the school to Cleveland.
This would constitute an argumentative denial, even if
there were no dire.ct denials in the answer. And we
submit that hecaus·e of the court's erroneous rulings on
the demurrers, and in granting the writ of mandamus,
tltP judgment in said action should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HENRY RuGGERI,

Attorney for Appellants.
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